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Palestinian citizens of Israel

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Introduction

The sociological and political developments within the Arab-Palestinian community in Israel and the ongoing estrangement policies of the state vis-à-vis this community have led to growing tensions and increased confrontation between the two sides. The leadership of the Arab-Palestinian community and the leadership of the state, especially the right-wing government that won power in early 2009, understand that state–minority relations can be viewed in internal Israeli terms but also as a central component of the broader Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Neither leadership has decided clearly which understanding is preferable. As a result, one can speak of a spectrum of relationships between the state and the Arab-Palestinian community within it that keep shifting, mostly in the direction of confrontation rather than conciliation. This shift brings to the fore the need for new models of analysis that go beyond a vertical understanding of Israeli–Palestinian relations. Horizontal conceptions, where the entire Israeli control system is viewed as one entity in which the normalization of Jewish life leads to the fragmentation and ghettoization of Palestinian life, are more accurate to an understanding of Israeli policies and Palestinian reactions in the last decade.

This chapter demonstrates that the gap in the expectations of both sides is the major cause of their bad relationship. Before continuing, it is important to note that, for the sake of clarity, this essay regards the relationship between the state and the Arab-Palestinian community as one between two "homogeneous" players. State and minority are seen as two active agents, operating in circumstances that condition their mutual behavior.

The state is not a unified political agent. It is a complex institutional structure that can have contradictory policies. The Arab-Palestinian minority is also a complex social entity, wherein different groups can have contradictory interests. Notwithstanding this argument, it is claimed that the mechanisms of delegitimizing the Arab-Palestinian minority facilitated by state institutions, especially the Knesset, and the resulting areas of contention exploited by the Arab-Palestinian minority have been on the rise in the last decade. In the triangular relationship between contention, accommodation, and control we witness a clear retreat from the mutual accommodation of both parties and a growing tendency towards contention on the part of the Arab-Palestinian minority and towards new forms of control by the Israeli state.

Recent developments in state–minority relations raise questions as to the future status of the Arab-Palestinian minority in Israel and future trends in this relationship, especially in light of two major external processes. The first is the stalemate in the peace process between Israel and the Palestinian Authority and the continuation of Israel's repressive policies in the Occupied Territories. The second is the policies adopted by a growing number of states, especially in Europe and North America, to accommodate the individual and collective rights of various types of minority (McGarry *et al.* 2008). These two processes reflect contradictory trends in conflict resolution and management and have negative repercussions on state–minority relations in Israel.

The horizons of expectations of both parties form a central factor in determining the role of past experience and present relationship; it is therefore necessary to look at both sides in order to explain the rising tensions and to predict possible developments. In general, state expectations of the Palestinian minority were based on citizenship as accommodation and submission. The state adopted policies of control and neglect in order to meet these expectations. On the other hand, the Palestinian minority expected the state to recognize its substantial citizenship, respect its indigenous status, accommodate its individual and collective rights, and integrate its members as equals in all realms of public life.

In the early years of the state, the minority accepted the framework of majority–minority relations as determining its status. It submitted itself to policies of integration. But, as a result of state control and neglect, a new discourse of contention arose, involving the basic demand that, as the indigenous people of Palestine colonized by an immigrant-settler movement that uprooted them from their homeland, their collective rights be accommodated. The disappointment of the Palestinians occasioned by state policies led to a major shift in their expectations and a refusal to accept the majority–minority citizenship framework as determining the relationship between the two sides. The state policy of "hollowing out" Arab citizenship until it becomes devoid of meaning and the continuation of the occupation encouraged calls by the Arab-Palestinian community for closer bonds with Palestinian communities in the Occupied Territories and for the right of return of the Palestinian refugees. The Arab-Palestinian demand for the normalization of relations between their community and the rest of the Palestinian people was viewed by the state as "radicalization" and as a betrayal of their loyalty.

Turning points in state–minority relations

The Palestinian citizens of Israel are the remaining indigenous inhabitants of Palestine that managed to hold on to their places of habitation in the 1948 war. They turned from a majority people into a small minority in the Israeli state, which became the home of a majority of Jews who had mostly immigrated to Palestine in the fifty years before the UN recognition of the Israeli state in 1948. The Palestinian minority remained in three major areas inside Israel – the Galilee, the Triangle area, and the Negev – with a small number in what has been coined the "mixed" cities of Akka, Haifa, Jaffa, Ramleh, and Lod.

The entire Palestinian population was subject to military government based on the emergency regulations set forth by the British Mandate government in 1945. These regulations bypassed the regular legal and judicial system in order to combat the rising activism of anti-British forces – Jewish and Palestinian – that sought to remove the Mandate government. Despite the condemnation of these regulations by both Jewish and Palestinian political groups, the government of Israel maintained them as part of the legal system of the state and applied them in Palestinian areas, enabling the state to bypass the official legal system and set the entire Palestinian population in a state of exception, where they were ruled by military officers

(Kretzmer 1990). This military rule, which lasted until 1966, was eased gradually after 1960, but only after achieving its declared and undeclared goals.

Although the military administration was justified by the Israeli government as addressing security needs, it is clear that it served other purposes that had strategic importance for the state and which had nothing to do with the immediate security threat. The first of its three main undeclared goals throughout its eighteen-year duration was the institutionalization of the economic dependence of the Palestinian minority on the Jewish economy. This was achieved by two interrelated policies: first, the transfer of lands from Palestinian ownership to the state by means that made martial law necessary and, second, establishing a regime of transport permits that limited the freedom of movement of Palestinian workers and blocked their ability to compete freely with Jewish workers in the job market. The second goal was the intimidation of the national political leaders that remained inside Israel after the Palestinian exodus and ensuring through disciplinary measures that the rest of the population accepted its submissive role inside the new political structure. The third goal of the military government had to do with blocking the return of Palestinian refugees from outside what has become recognized as the borders of the Israeli state, the destruction of the Palestinian villages that were depopulated and where no Jewish settlement was established, and the institutionalization of the demographic reality of the Palestinian population, especially turning the "temporary" residency of the internal refugees in neighboring villages into a permanent situation.

The military government achieved most of its economic and demographic goals. It facilitated the transfer of most Arab lands into the hands of the state, it made the agricultural Palestinian society dependent on the Jewish economy, and it managed to freeze the demographic reality that was established during the 1948 war, segregating the Palestinians from the Jewish population and fragmenting them from within (Lustick; 1980; Jiryis 1976; Zureik 1979).

The first turning point in the history of the relationship between the state and the Palestinian minority unfolded when, six months after the military government was lifted in December 1966, Israel occupied the Palestinian areas of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as the Syrian Golan Heights and the Egyptian Sinai peninsula. The Six Day War in June 1967 made it necessary for the state to change its technologies of control and surveillance tactics and to shift most of its military and policing energies into the newly Occupied Territories. The Palestinians inside Israel were exposed to the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in which relatives and family members lived as refugees. Furthermore, the Palestinian citizens of Israel were exposed to the political and cultural forces in the Occupied Territories, which instigated trends whose implications were understood more than a decade later.

The 1967 war set the stage for major political and economic changes in Palestinian society in Israel that were translated into the Israeli reality in the decades that followed. One of the events it triggered was the first Land Day, on 30 March 1976, which marked the proactive strategy of struggle by the Palestinian community against policies of discrimination, especially in the field of land confiscation, but also in the allocation of resources and in the job market. The first Land Day, during which the police gunned down and killed six demonstrators, was the first nationwide and centrally orchestrated strike of the Palestinian population in Israel. It became a central memorial day among the Palestinians in Israel and was later marked by all Palestinians no matter where they live.

Another important turning point in the history of the Palestinian population in Israel is the signing of the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and the ensuing establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PA). This was significant since it entailed the separation of the solution of the Palestinian national problem from the future political and legal status of Palestinians in Israel. It resulted in a serious realignment in the

Arab party structure, where two new lists – one Islamic and one national – entered the political game in competition with the Hadash list, which had dominated the Arab scene until then. The 1996 elections to the Israeli Knesset marked a differentiation process by which a clear division was seen between those who sought to influence the future of the Palestinian community from within the Israeli formal political system and those who did not trust this strategy and claimed that the price paid by legitimizing the system was too high relative to the possible gains. While Hadash, which represented the communist-secular voter, Balad, which represented the national-secular voter, and the United Arab List, which represented the Islamist-religious-conservative voter, took over 80 percent of the Arab vote in the Knesset elections, part of the Abna'a Al-Balad movement and part of the Islamic movement chose not to participate in the elections. The latter represented national and Islamic potential voters that were not convinced that representation in the Knesset was the way to gain Palestinian rights, especially since the Knesset had enacted the laws that had led to the suppression and disenfranchisement of the Palestinian community in the first place. Since 1996 these splits between the two camps and within each of them have remained more or less the same, weakening the political effectiveness of the entire community vis-à-vis the Israeli state.

Another crucial turning point in the history of the Palestinian minority in the Israeli state was marked by the events of October 2000, in which thousands of Arab citizens marched the streets to express their protest against Israel's repressive policies in the Occupied Territories and against the regression in the equalization and liberalization policies initiated by the second Rabin government and retracted by the first Netanyahu government and then the Barak government. The fierce reaction of the Israeli police, leading to the killing of thirteen Palestinian citizens, deepened the rift between the Palestinian minority and the state. The years 2006–7 witnessed the publication of several vision documents by Palestinian NGOs, signaling the growing engagement of the latter in determining the social and political agenda of society. The documents echoed the political orientation of most of the Arab-Palestinian community in Israel, despite the fact that the public was not sufficiently consulted. This step led to the intensification of surveillance and control policies by the state, initiated after the October 2000 events. The state policies towards the Palestinian minority revitalized the perceptions of the early years of the state, where the Arab-Palestinian minority was conceived mainly in security terms (Lustick 1980; Reiter 2009).

The rise of an educated elite and new political leadership

The Palestinian community in Israel underwent major changes in regard to its demographic composition and weight. One that had a significant impact on Arab politics was the increase in Arab academics, intellectuals, and professionals. The available data on Arab students and academics show a clear growth in their numbers (Al-Haj 2003). The 1948 war led to the expulsion of most Arab elites, including intellectuals, and so the number of higher degree holders remaining in Israel after the war was very small. In 1956–7 there were forty-six Arab students (0.6 percent of all students in Israeli universities that year). In the school year 1979–80 the number was 1,634 (3 percent). The percentage of Arab students completing their BA studies rose in the decade 1988–98 from 6.7 percent to 8.7 percent. In 1998–9 the number of Arab students rose to 7,903 (or 7.1 percent). According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, the number of university graduates reached 7,200 in 2000–1 and 9,967 in 2004–5. The figure for students in colleges was 2,000 in 1999–2000 and 4,553 in 2004–5.[1] According to Rikaz, the databank for Palestinians in Israel, the total number of Arabs completing sixteen years of education and above in 2002 was 52,032.[2] This number had reached 94,486 by 2004, showing a

very clear trend in the Arab community, where the academic and professional elite is growing rapidly (Manna 2008).

A brief look at the elected Arab leaders, especially in the Knesset, shows that major changes are taking place among this elite group, where there is a rising number of academics – something that is slowly but surely changing its political orientation and influencing its modes and patterns of mobilization towards the state. Among educated Arab citizens, only a small number have managed to gain access to Israeli academic institutions. Nevertheless, those that have done so have become well connected to developments in academic discourse in regard to issues related to the status of the Arab community in Israel, especially as far as political and human rights are concerned. Arab academics have contributed to placing Arab citizens' rights on the academic and political stage in Israel as well as in international tribunes. There is also a large group of Arab professionals, especially lawyers and human rights activists, in organizations in Israel and abroad. These professionals are connected to international human rights organizations and are fully aware of changes in world politics in regard to human – individual and group – rights. The Arab academics and professionals that form the vanguard of the Arab community seek ways to promote the community's civic, political, economic, and cultural rights. They increasingly provide the moral, legal, and political legitimizing foundations for the full incorporation of Arab citizenry into the Israeli decision-making mechanism, especially the right to be effectively represented in institutions that determine the future private and public life of Arabs in Israel (Jamal 2006). Since the Arab elite has very marginal power in state institutions, it has had little influence on public policies towards its constituency (Ghanem and Mustafa 2009; Jamal 2006), and this lack of power is particularly frustrating when it comes to shaping the self-understanding of the Arab community and in determining its relationship to others (Jamal 2006). The demand for collective rights therefore opens new structural opportunities for leadership roles that are lacking at the state level, roles that may unlock new avenues of representation, internally and externally, that empower the leadership and, as a result, the community. Tremendous changes have been taking place among leaders and in leadership in the Palestinian community. Although reasons of space do not allow for expansion on the characteristics of these changes, suffice it to say that the Arab leadership in Israel during the first decades of the new state's existence was a product of the *Nakba*. The 1948 war wiped out almost all the political, economic, and cultural elite from the area that became Israel; in particular, those that were involved in any type of resistance to the Zionist movement and to establishing a Jewish state were expelled (Sa'di and Abu Lughod 2007). The Israeli armed forces had information about all influential persons and targeted them (Cohen 2010; Pappe 2006). Those who had a leading position and remained inside Israel had to submit to new rules set by the state. The imposition of military rule on Arab society at the end of the war severely limited the community's freedom of expression, movement, and organization, as well as any possibilities for real political mobilization. Meanwhile, in their quest to control Arab society, the authorities made a practice of cultivating ambitious young members of large clans remaining in Israel (often from what had been the periphery of Palestinian society) who were willing to cooperate with the state in exchange for seats in the Knesset or other positions of power (Lustick 1980). It was such individuals who dominated the Arab lists affiliated with the dominant Mapai (later Labor) Party in Knesset elections up to the late 1970s (Zureik 1979; Ghanem 2001). Thus, most of the post-1948 leadership was pragmatic, traditional, based on family and religious affiliation, instrumental in its outlook, and subservient to the dictates of the state. Most of the leaders of the Arab lists had hardly any formal basic education (Jamal 2006), and many had attended only elementary school. They belonged to a large family in their area, managed to win the support of a large family that provided them with the social backing needed in order

to compete with contenders, or were blindly loyal to the dictates of the state and provided services that no other leaders were willing to or could provide, such as roads, electricity services, and running water.

The exceptions to the rule of Israeli-sponsored Arab leaders during the early years of the state came from the al-Ard movement (which espoused a nationalist platform and called for a Palestinian state on the basis of the 1947 UN partition plan) and the binational Arab–Jewish Communist Party.[3] Leaders in these two frameworks were, like their counterparts on the Mapai lists, relatively young when they rose to prominence, but better educated and "self-made." The al-Ard leaders were mostly descendants of internally displaced Palestinian families who had lost their main sources of income and social power as a result of the Israeli land expropriation policies. Some of them came from lower-middle-class families with a clear national consciousness that viewed the Israeli reality in pure colonial terms, which clashed directly with their own aspirations and the basic interests of the Palestinian people. These leaders, such as Anis Kardosh, Habib Kahwaje, Jabur Jabur, Zaki al-Karmi, Naim Makhul, Sabri Jiryis, Mohamad Miari, Nadim Al-Kassem, Abdel Aziz Abu Isba'a, Tawfik Odeh, Mohamad Sruji, and Sami Nasser, were more educated than the average leaders of the Arab community. They are better seen as a direct continuation of the pre-1948 national leadership but with a more realistic worldview and a greater understanding of the power of the Zionist movement and its clash with the basic aspirations of the Palestinian people and the Arab nation (Farah 1985: 266).

The Arab leaders of the Israeli Communist Party (ICP) were also young and more educated than the leaders of the Mapai Arab lists. Most of them were in their twenties, were active in the Palestinian Communist Party before 1948, and, because of their support of the UN partition plan, were allowed to remain in Israel despite their critique of governmental policies. High-ranking leaders of the party originated mostly from the Greek Orthodox Christian community, such as Emile Habibi, Tawfik Toubi, Emile Touma, Saliba Khamis, and Nimer Murkus. Loyal to their Marxist–Leninist ideology, they viewed Jewish–Palestinian relations mostly in class terms and criticized state policies of discrimination based on class exploitation. Communist Arab leaders supported the establishment of a Palestinian state, demanded the return of Palestinian refugees to their original homes, and appealed against the land expropriation policies of the state. Simultaneously, they spoke of the right of the State of Israel to exist, of the legitimacy of Jewish immigration to Israel, and of Jewish–Arab brotherhood in fighting state discriminatory policies (Farah 1985: 254). They were persecuted for defending Arab interests and for raising issues of high sensitivity, such as the status of refugees, the military government, and land expropriation policies. But since Arab communists were a minority in a Jewish–Arab party, they were not in a position to stop or limit the constructive cooperation between some of the Jewish leaders and leaders of the state (Kaufman 1997). (This situation changed in 1965, when an Arab-dominated faction more sympathetic to Arab nationalist demands split from the ICP to form Rakah, which won three seats – two Arab – in the Knesset elections that year.)

One concrete indicator of change can be seen in the educational level of Knesset members (MKs). Until 1981, most Arab MKs, especially those associated with the Labor Party, were uneducated. Only seven out of all seventy MKs between 1949 and 1984 had a BA degree, and nineteen had not even attended school regularly. In comparison, from 1984 until the eighteenth Knesset (elected in 2009), seventy of the seventy-nine MKs had at least a BA degree, while in the last few years there has been a growing number with MAs or PhDs.

Outside the realm of formal politics, young Arabs with leadership abilities seeking avenues of mobilization autonomous from state control gravitated towards Arab NGOs, which began to be established in the mid-1970s to advocate community interests and provide services to the Arab community in areas neglected by the state. Based on a survey of ninety-seven civil

activists in twenty active NGOs, the average age of individuals is thirty-four, 75 percent have an academic degree, and 16 percent have completed some other form of higher education. Of 159 board members of another twenty Arab-Palestinian NGOs, 20 percent hold a professor-ship, while 12 percent have a PhD, 19 percent a Masters degree, 49 percent a Bachelors degree, and 10 percent a higher education diploma. These data reflect the same trend viewed in Knes-set members, who are far more educated and to a large extent also considerably younger than traditional leaders.

Unlike the older leadership, which was nurtured and in some cases "created" by the Israeli establishment, the new generation had to struggle to obtain their positions within formal dem-ocratic frameworks. Traditional political mobility, based mainly on familial or clan ties, began to give way to new patterns of mobility shaped by democratic procedures and competition. One result was that individuals from smaller families or lower socio-economic backgrounds could reach positions of power, whether as MKs, party leaders, or heads of municipalities, thanks to their education or professional skills, their ability to operate within the democratic process, and/or their familiarity with Israeli political culture. Many of the main leaders who emerged in the 1990s, such as Muhamad Barakeh, Saleh Salim, Muhamad Kana'an, Hanna Swed, Issam Makhul, Afew Egbarieh, Haneen Zouabi, Masud Ghanayeem, Abdel Wahab Darawsheh, Azmi Bishara, Wasel Taha, Jamal Zahalka, Ahmad Tibi, Said Nafa'a, and Abdel Malek Dahamsheh, exemplify this change, as do many leaders at the local level, for example, the former and current heads of the Follow-up Committee – the highest representative body of the Arab-Palestinian community in Israel – namely, Shawki Khatib and Muhamad Zeidan, and also the mayor of Nazareth Ramez Jaraysi. At the same time, the mechanical and some-what artificial attention to religious affiliation that went into the composition of the Mapai lists gave way, especially with the rise of Rakah–Hadash, to a religious diversity more representa-tive of the party constituency. A similar pattern exists in the other Arab parties, where religious affiliation is either marginal or relatively representative. This does not mean that religious affili-ation is not important. All Arab parties, especially the secular ones, seek to reserve seats for a Christian representative, since Muslims form the vast majority of the Arab community. In Hadash, as well as in Balad, one of the three leading seats of the candidates' list for the Knesset is usually allocated to a Christian candidate, although there is no official quota declared. This issue is not usually acknowledged by party officials, although informally the sectarian composi-tion of the party lists plays a major role before every election.[4] Balad was the first to allocate a quota to women, in the eighteenth Knesset elections in 2009. The party decided that women had to be represented in the first three seats, which led to the election of Haneen Zouabi, the first Arab woman on an Arab list to be elected to the Knesset.

State expectations concerning minority behavior

The Israeli state, established as a Jewish state, expected the remaining Palestinian minority to accept the political realities resulting from the 1948 war. This was manifested in official docu-mentations of the state, especially the Declaration of Independence, in proclamations by Israeli leaders, and in policy statements. Palestinians were required gradually to disconnect from the rest of the Palestinian people, accept their official definition as "Israeli Arabs," and respect the boundaries set by their selective Israeli citizenship. The state began constructing political, edu-cational, and disciplining policies that aimed to create a new minority collective imagination. "Israeli Arabs" were to conceive themselves as Israeli citizens, as if their history as a social group started with the establishment of the Israeli state. The politics of fear and policies of discipline were the main mechanisms for facilitating the resocialization process taking place in the official

educational system, which was fully under the control of Jewish educators (Al-Haj 1995; Abu-Asbah 2007). Citizenship was introduced by the state as a "control mechanism," its major characteristics being loyalty and patriotism. An attempt was even made in mid-1950 to draft Arab citizens into the army, though ultimately this was not implemented (Cohen 2010; Jiryis 1976). This theory of citizenship did not succeed in protecting Arab citizens from the interference and penetration of state agencies (Yiftachel 2006). Thus, sentiments pertaining to the Palestinian past or sympathy with the Palestinian cause, especially concerning historical injustice and the miserable refugee situation, were interpreted as a serious security threat by the state authorities and as a betrayal of the commitments entailed in citizenship. Thus a situation was created whereby legal affiliation to the Israeli state should determine the worldview of the Arab minority.

Another expectation of the state entailed making the Palestinian minority accept and respect its secondary status in a Jewish national state. This meant accepting both the formal definition of the state as a "state of the Jewish people" and the material superiority of the Jewish majority, as well as accommodating the Jewish symbolic order of the state. The Arab–Palestinian minority was required to adapt to the priorities set by the state concerning the absorption of a growing number of Jewish immigrants and the allocation of resources in the areas of housing, settlement, development, and education. The state viewed these priorities as both natural and necessary in order to realize its character as the nation-state of the Jewish people. The Arab–Palestinian minority, which conceived of itself as the indigenous inhabitants of the land, was expected to accept the official line and act accordingly. A sophisticated system of control was implemented, establishing what has been termed "good Arabs," "positive Arabs," and "quiet Arabs" – a system that continues in various forms to this very day (Jamal 2010; Cohen 2010; Lustick 1980).

Another embedded expectation of the state has to do with the total submission of the Arab–Palestinian minority to the limited ethnic majoritarian political game. The Israeli regime was and still is officially defined as democratic, despite the fact that the Palestinians had to live under a military government until 1966 and continue to be excluded from real participation in the political process. Yet the Arab–Palestinian minority was expected to play according to the rules of the democratic process and accept polices based on majority rule. The fact that the majority was ethnically based and preserved itself through demographic engineering was left out of the political agenda. The democratic procedures of majority decisions have been translated, as in most deeply divided societies, into ethnic majoritarian despotism, leading to the minority's loss of tangible influence on policy-making, especially in matters related to its own well-being and interests (Jamal 2009b). This pattern has been intensified in the last decade, contrary to claims of liberalization and democratization, leading to a lack of any substantial meaning in Arab–Palestinian citizenship (Jamal 2007a). The ethos of defensive democracy has been utilized in order to justify such politics, despite the fact that the Jewish majority in Israel has absolute power over state mechanisms and an automatic majority that is able to pass any decision it wishes.

Another major expectation of the state of its Arab–Palestinian citizens is that they accept their citizenship as the major determinant of their response to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. In other words, the state expected them to free themselves of the national aspirations of the Palestinian people and accept their civil status in the Israeli Jewish state as the peak of their political ambitions. That is what Israeli leaders mean when they say that the national rights of the Palestinians, including those in Israel, will be met in a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Arab–Palestinian citizens are expected to ignore their national, social, and cultural bonds with their brethren at the same time as the Israeli state seeks to deepen the relationship between the Jewish majority in Israel and the entire Jewish people around the world.

Major efforts and material resources are invested in hosting Jewish Americans and Europeans in Israel, aiming to connect them to Zionist ideology and goals.

State policies of control and neglect

The system developed by the state was translated into policies designed to translate the expectations into reality. The policies were developed in various fields and were coordinated either by the Prime Minister's Office through the advisor on Arab affairs or by the minister in charge of Arab affairs in the Israeli government. Many of the studies of state–minority relations in Israel have focused attention on the politics of control of the minority. Their contribution has been enormous to understanding the micro-politics of control and the mechanisms used to penetrate this society and its social formations. However, one cannot ignore the other side of the control coin – namely, neglect – which has been manifested over the years through the politics of de-development and underdevelopment.

The first policy has been to establish by legal means the economic dependence of the Arab-Palestinian minority on state institutions and the Jewish market, intensifying the proletarianization of Arab society, while constructing a Jewish national material and symbolic space that excludes the Arabs (Haidar 1995; Kretzmer 1990). Another policy has been de-development and underdevelopment of Arab towns and villages by minimizing investment in Arab society and allocating resources to nurture loyalty and patronage among local political forces (Hasson and Karayani 2006). In addition to the elimination of agricultural infrastructure and the land expropriation policy, which has reduced areas under Arab control, sophisticated planning and zoning policies and intensive construction of Jewish settlements has led to the ghettoization of Arab towns and cities (Jamal 2008b). The state established a tradition of discriminatory policy regarding the allocation of resources to Arab municipalities and educational and welfare institutions, which was admitted and condemned in the report of the Or Commission (2003). Israel also sought

- to suppress attempts to establish an effective nationwide Arab leadership, while not recognizing the representative bodies of the Palestinian community, such as the Follow-Up Committee (Jamal 2006; Lustick 1980);
- to restrict the maneuvering space of Arab political parties, while utilizing ethnic majoritarian rule to deny Arab leaders any political influence; and
- to delegitimize popular social movements and public mobilization by calling on the loyalty of the Hebrew media and by a widespread body of informers within Arab society itself.

Minority expectations from the state

The Arab Palestinians who remained within the areas controlled by the Israeli army after the 1948 war did not expect the newly established state to divert from its policy and allow them to stay in their villages and houses. The fear resulting from the rumors concerning the actions of the Israeli army in neighboring areas, together with the population census conducted in November 1948, convinced many Palestinians that the state was preparing for a massive expulsion. The sense of fear heralded by their surprise defeat in the war and by the imposition of a military government in Arab areas influenced the expectations and the reactions of the Arab-Palestinian minority.

The first and most dominant hope of the minority was to be recognized as citizens and to purchase Israeli citizenship. Israeli citizenship became suddenly the insurance policy against expulsion and for the protection of private property. The poverty in Arab-Palestinian society

resulting from the 1948 war, the policies of neglect by the state, and the lack of strong Arab leadership resulting from the deportation and fleeing of the social, economic, and political elite during the war led to a deep sense of existential threat and limited expectations of survival. The need to remain in their homeland pushed Arab Palestinians to ask merely to be accepted as citizens of the State of Israel. This did not contain any substantial political or cultural content. The fear of deportation was strong, and therefore Arab Palestinians sought to fulfill the expectations of state representatives in Arab villages and towns. The need to demonstrate loyalty and quiescence determined their minimal expectations. This population hoped merely to be allowed to meet its basic needs for shelter and work to ensure a basic income.

The struggle for citizenship changed over time. After having guaranteed their right to remain in their homeland, Arab-Palestinian citizens began expanding the meaning of citizenship, seeking to win equal status. To that end, most of them were willing to accept their integration in the state on the conditions determined by the Jewish majority. However, according to the democratic principle of non–discrimination, they demanded to be treated equally by state institutions and to be recognized as legitimate citizens on an equal footing in the jobs market.

An important expectation of the Arab homeland minority is that Palestinian national rights should be translated into statehood in the territories devoted to that purpose in the UN partition plan from 1947, and later to the territories occupied by Israel in the 1967 war. This was manifested by intensive participation in the Israeli electoral system in order to strengthen those parties that supported peaceful resolution of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and Israel's surrender of the territories occupied in 1967, while recognizing the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian cause. This expectation was translated into the "two states for two peoples" formula promoted by the Communist Party, which for more than two decades was the major party in the Arab community.

As a result of their negative experience with state institutions, and fully aware of the discriminatory policies adopted by the state towards them, the Arab-Palestinian minority began developing new discourses to guarantee them equal status as full citizens. A major demand was to be recognized and respected as an indigenous and national minority – a new formulation of the older demand for integration. Whereas in the past Arab political parties and civic institutions, especially those affiliated with the Communist Party, had emphasized the integrative rights of individual Arab-Palestinian citizens, this new discourse spoke the language of collective rights based on national and cultural grounds. New political parties established in the mid-1980s and in the 1990s brought to the fore Palestinian national affiliation and the ethnic identity of the state as the major factors behind the secondary status of the Arab-Palestinian minority (Ghanem 2001). The discourse of recognition was added to that of allocation and the demand that Israel be transformed from an exclusive ethnic state into a state for all its citizens. Arab-Palestinian leaders raised the expectation that Israel should guarantee the indigenous minority cultural autonomy as a necessary step towards accommodating their basic human and national rights and as a precondition for historical reconciliation.

Minority behavior: from accommodation to contention

The behavior of the minority cannot be fully discussed in this context. This section summarizes the important patterns which have major implications for state–minority relations.

Since the granting of citizenship to non-Jews immediately after the 1948 war was not automatic, and was based not on the principle of the right of return but rather on location, birth, and naturalization, and since many Arab-Palestinian inhabitants did not dare register their

names in the population census of November 1948, many were denied citizenship. Therefore, one of the major efforts pursued by members of the minority was to confirm their citizenship, thereby guaranteeing their stay in their homes or nearby as internal refugees. The political response of the majority of the Arab–Palestinian minority in the initial years of the Israeli state could be depicted as accommodative, although one cannot speak of complete quiescence (Lustick 1980). This accommodative behavior by the majority of the Palestinian population was aimed at ensuring the provision of minimal living conditions to the Arab villages and towns that lacked the most basic economic infrastructure (Rekhess 1993).

The majority of the Arab leadership showed toleration of the Jewish character of the state, as long as it was not invoked in exclusive and discriminatory terms. This led to a clear distinction between the political future of the Palestinians in Israel and the rest of the Palestinian people which was reflected in the slogans of the political parties that dominated the Arab political scene (Smooha 2005). This meant differentiating between the legitimacy of state institutions and the illegitimate policies adopted by them and not challenging the Jewish character of the state. That changed in the mid-1980s when the idea of the exclusive Jewish character of Israel started to be promoted by the state.

Concluding remarks

The recapturing of power by the national right-wing parties in Israel has brought to the fore the centrality of the exclusive ethno-national ideology in Israeli society and the unwillingness of most Israeli Jews to compromise for the sake of peace with the Palestinians living under occupation and to promote equal citizenship to all. The reemergence of the ideological right and the declining influence of the left in Israeli society have been matched by the rise in influence of Islamic and national discourses in Arab-Palestinian society. The Islamic movement began mobilizing social forces to support its ideological and political agenda, and secular political voices have also adopted a stronger national discourse (Ghanem and Mustafa 2009). Both Islamic and secular national forces began targeting the ethno-national character of the Israeli state and simultaneously closing the gaps between the demands of the Arab-Palestinian minority in Israel and the entire Palestinian people, including the refugees. Although these changes in the political discourse were not accepted by all parties in Arab society, especially the Communist Party, they became the dominating slogans and the motivating force behind the political conduct of the Arab-Palestinian minority.

These changes have widened the gaps between the expectations of both sides – the Israeli state and the Arab-Palestinian minority. The future-vision documents and the official reaction to them form an important indication as to this growing gap (Jamal 2007a). They were published when it became clear that the Israeli state did not intend to implement the recommendations of the Or Commission report, but rather to render it void of any substance by introducing a counter-policy of penetration, disciplining, surveillance, and control (Jamal 2008a). Furthermore, they were published when it was clear that the Israeli state did not intend to withdraw from the Occupied Territories, but instead to continue its settlement policies, thus closing the door on the two-state solution.

The future-vision documents were formulated by Arab secular civil institutions, led by a new generation of intellectuals. They reflected popular ideas that were not fully expressed by the political parties for reasons that have to do with the legal limitation imposed on political participation through the amendment of the election laws in 2002. The documents, despite the differences between them, define the common ground accepted in Arab-Palestinian society in

Israel, which demands the full democratization of the Israeli state, its de-ethnicization, the accommodation of the collective rights of the Arab-Palestinian minority, and the just resolution of the Palestinian question, including the internal and external refugee problem. These demands are formulated in political and legal terms and framed within international and humanitarian law.

The future-vision documents share several premises. First, they establish the claim that the Arab-Palestinian minority in Israel is an indigenous people, a national minority, and a homeland minority that deserves a special collective regime of rights (Jamal 2008a). Second, all documents take the existence of the State of Israel for granted, albeit not in its current form. All documents view the exclusive ethnic identity of the state as a source of disturbance in majority–minority relations and demand structural transformations of and in the state. Third, all documents demand a special combination of individual and collective rights if the basic rights of the Arab minority are to be genuinely met. Fourth, all documents take into account the tension between the civic and national identity of the Arab community resulting from defining the state in ethnic terms. Aware that neither national community – Jew or Arab – is willing to give up its national identity, the documents seek to strike a balance between civic identity and national affiliation. In this respect, the documents are optimistic regarding a possible combination between national affiliation and liberal-civic culture. They reiterate what has been called liberal nationalism within a civic political entity that enables the various communities within the two nations to enjoy their rights and protect their identities in an atmosphere of tolerance and reconciliation. The examples of Britain, Canada and Spain, where various ethno-cultural and national groups have established political systems and regimes of rights that accommodate their rights and common life within one state, form a source of inspiration.

The horizon of expectations opened by the future-vision documents does not correspond to the policies adopted by Israeli governments in the last decade, especially the radical right-wing government established in Israel in 2009, which has not halted racist legislation aimed at delegitimizing and controlling the Arab-Palestinian minority. The idea of a fusion of horizons and the preliminary demand of mutual recognition does not seem to be on the agenda in Israel today. Therefore, the current situation of cautious quiescence can be viewed only as a temporary condition.

The trend in state–minority relations explicated so far makes it necessary to shift our analysis if we are fully to understand Israeli–Palestinian dynamics. The classical models that accept the separation between the Israeli state and the Occupied Territories and view state–minority relations as an internal Israeli affair must be replaced by models that look at the entire Israeli control system. The developments of the last decade demonstrate that Israeli policy is aimed at normalizing Jewish life, wherever Jews live, including in the settlements in the Occupied Territories. In order to achieve this goal, Israel has been pursuing a policy of fragmentation and ghettoization towards Palestinians, whether citizens or not. Although there are still inconsistencies between the application of this policy in the Occupied Territories and inside the Green Line, the logic of Judaization and, as a result, of de-Palestinization is the same. Israeli policies are leading to two spheres of existence within the areas of the Israeli control system – one Jewish, which is normalized, and one Palestinian, which is an ongoing state of exception.

Notes

1 Central Bureau of Statistics, "The Arab Population in Israel," *Statisti-lite*, no. 27 (2001), p. 9.
2 See www.rikaz.org.

3   The party, which was Arab–Jewish from its initial years in the 1920s, was split into an Arab party and a Jewish party in 1943 as a result of the intensifying conflict between the Zionist movement and the Palestinian national movement.

4   Personal interview with Mtanis Shihadeh, a potential candidate for Balad, 21 February 2010.

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