Sectarian media and the destruction of what remains

May 17, 2014

By: Dr. Khaled Al-Hroub

To begin with, it cannot be said that all religious media falls under the description of sectarian or extremist media, and it is unobjective to apply any general or sweeping description to this media. Hence, it is essential to establish this basic introduction before addressing any discussion on the subject. The focus in the following lines is specifically on the extremist and sectarian aspects of that media. Extremist religious media, particularly televised media, is a global phenomenon viewed in the context of the globalization of communications in recent decades. The consequences resulting from this media are diverse and depend on the specific political and social context, the editorial agenda of each media case, and the level of tension among the key players in the relevant context. Practically, religious media in the West, particularly in the United States, was the first to use television screens to spread religious calls on a mass scale. While religious media share some common features regardless of their geographical location or the religion they promote, some form unique special cases. Here, we focus on religious media in the Middle East, especially Sunni and Shia media.

A common feature of religious media, particularly the extreme ones, is reviving dormant doctrinal battles and broadcasting them into the popular consciousness. In the Middle East, in the context of the ongoing regional competition which takes on sectarian dimensions, the media in both camps engage in broadcasting and promoting exchanges regarding doctrinal and religious disputes that were traditionally elitist and confined to the domain of religious scholars and theologians. These were battles that were of no concern to ordinary people and faded with time. Like all religions, there are deep differences between theological schools and various sects within Islam, but they remained restricted to the specialized circles of jurists and scholars of religion. Similarly, the differences between Shia and Sunni trace back to the first century of the Hijra, but over time, the strands of disagreement in interpreting the sacred text became intertwined with strands of political conflict, turning opposing political stances into religious orthodoxies and radical beliefs over the centuries. Throughout Islamic history, conversion to either the Shia or Sunni sect often happened forcibly or near-forcibly by the kings and rulers after adopting a particular sectarian stance, not due to the conviction of the converts. Since the ruled had no choice but to comply with the rulers, they often followed their victorious leaders without feeling a pang of conscience. As for engaging in fundamental religious disputes and providing religious justifications for what was essentially political, it remained largely the domain of scholars and jurists, especially those who allied with the rulers. Meanwhile, at the level of ordinary people, where mixed groups of Shia and Sunni lived, different degrees of coexistence prevailed, manifested in intense social interaction across all fields, most notably in mixed marriages. This was the case up until the 1970s, particularly in Iraq, the Gulf countries, and Lebanon.

However, a sudden shift occurred with the advent of cross-border media and its use as a weapon in regional rivalries, beginning with the Shiite Islamism movement and followed by the Sunni Islamist movement (specifically Salafism). With the rise and victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini did not hesitate to adopt two policies that greatly alarmed neighboring Arab countries, particularly those in the Gulf: the first was his claim to speak on behalf of all Muslims (both Shiite and Sunni), and the second was his declaration of the policy of exporting the Islamic Revolution, initially to neighboring countries. The Gulf reaction was immediate, seeking to thwart this claim by stirring up Sunni religious discourse opposed to the Shiite ideology, which had an attractive revolutionary glow even among Sunni communities that were disillusioned and yearning for any party that stood against Israel (as Iran did by closing the Israeli embassy and adopting an anti-Israel rhetoric).

Thus, people began to realize through religious channels that aired shallow and inflammatory content against Shiites or Sunnis, depending on the channel’s orientation, that many of their neighbors were, in fact, from “the other sect” whose Islam was considered incomplete by extremists on both sides. In light of harsh media wars and polemical discourse that glorified the collective self while claiming it had the “absolute right,” and calling for the eradication of the other sect as being misguided, the current political conflicts were re-framed through historical sectarian lenses. Historical grievances and unprovable claims were revived on television screens and in political discourse, and the focus shifted to how daily events could be tied to grand historical narratives, seeking to justify political actions and appeal to popular sentiment. A stark recent example of sectarian political statements was made by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who, during his visit to Karbala on December 25, 2013, linked his ongoing fight with Sunni armed groups to the seventh-century confrontation between Hussein and Yazid, describing Karbala as “the qibla” for all Muslims, a statement highly provocative to Sunnis, who view Mecca as the only qibla.

Religious media has contributed, and continues to contribute, to the erosion of the common social ground and to weakening the concept of citizenship, a fragile concept that has never had the chance to take deep root in any of the countries of the region after the colonial era ended. Religious and sectarian loyalties have replaced national affiliations and the concept of citizenship, in the context of weak or repressive states and a lack of feeling of belonging to them. Instead, a sense of fear and dread of the state has prevailed, and these loyalties have thrived, seeking references and authorities outside their nations. Cross-border media, especially religious media, has provided platforms for communication with those external references, meaning that Shiite or Sunni electoral segments in any country might feel a closer connection with similar groups outside their national borders. Since the 2003 Iraq War, which resulted in Shiite dominance of the Iraqi government, large Sunni segments in Iraq have felt marginalized by the state, and even the Iraqi Shiite majority might feel the same way. In this context, media coverage of Sunni grievances and marginalization in Iraq has created cross-border connections and expectations, pushing them to seek support and solidarity from “their Sunni brothers” in other countries.

The expanding reach and influence of cross-border media plays a negative role in dismantling the national space and replacing it with a weak, borderless religious space that brings together sectarian groups across different countries within the region. This deepens fragmentation and complicates the intertwining of religious and political loyalties across borders, providing fertile ground for future explosions.

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